基金在中国上市公司中发挥治理作用了吗——基于影响高管非自愿变更与业绩之间敏感性的分析  

Does Fund Play Governance Roles in Chinese Listed Companies? An Analysis Based on the Sensitivity between CEO Forced Turnover and Corporate Performance

作　　者：李胜楠[1] 刘一璇[1] 陈靖涵[2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部 [2]英国南安普顿大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2015年第2期4-14,共11页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71172067);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71002104)资助

摘　　要：基金作为重要的机构投资者在改善公司治理方面被寄予厚望,但是对基金能否在中国上市公司的治理中发挥积极作用则鲜有研究。本文首次按照基金监督对象的不同,将基金的监督作用分为"监督高管"和"监督大股东",从基金公司的治理状况出发检验在上市公司高管非自愿性变更决策中基金参与上市公司治理的途径。实证结果表明,在基金公司治理状况比较差的条件下,基金会与上市公司高管"合谋";而当基金公司治理状况比较好的条件下,基金公司在上市公司高管非自愿性变更决策中能够发挥"监督大股东"的治理作用;没有发现基金公司"监督高管"的证据。"监督大股东"假说的提出,既丰富了基金参与公司治理的理论,也是首次从企业微观决策层面发现基金在中国上市公司中发挥积极治理作用。Fund is highly evaluated as an important institutional investors in corporate governance in both academic research and practices. But its governance role in Chinese listed companies is rarely explored. This article tries to contribute this issue from a new perspective, the different monitoring subjects.According to different kind of fund supervision, we classify the supervisory roles of the fund into ＂Executive Oversight＂ and ＂Major Shareholder Oversight＂, and further study the sensitivity between CEO involuntary turnover and corporate performance considering the difference of governance level of fund company.The empirical results show that, under the prevalence of major shareholder dominance in corporate decisions in Chinese listed companies, fund managers and executives of listed companies are prone to conspire to expropriate the minority shareholders when the fund corporate governance is relatively poor.But the fund company can play an important monitoring role in the decision-making of CEO involuntary turnover and constrain the major shareholder＇s self-interested behaviors when the fund corporate governance is relatively robust. In this situation, the fund may urge low-performance companies to adopt effective strategies to improve the performance instead of turnover the CEO, thus weakening the possibility of CEO involuntary turnover because of the poor performance. On the other hand, we don＇t find the evidence of the collusion between fund managers and firm executives.These results are different from that of Del Guercio et al.（2008） and Helwege et al.（2012） fund in the developed countries, are also different from that of Pan（2012） fund in China. The ＂Monitoring Major Shareholder＂ hypothesis not only enriches the theory of the Fund＇s par ticipation in cor porate gover nance, but also provide the micro-level evidence for the positive role of fund in the governance of listed companies in China. This article reveal a unique governance role of fund in their invested firms in China＇s

关 键 词：基金参与治理 高管非自愿性变更—业绩敏感性 控制性大股东 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224