财务舞弊、家族控制与上市公司高管更替  

Financial Fraud、Family Control and Executives' Turnover In Listed Company

作　　者：张健[1,2] 刘斌[1] 吴先聪[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆交通大学财经学院,重庆400074 [3]西南政法大学管理学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2015年第2期1-9,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：重庆市教委科学技术资助项目(KJ1400331);重庆市科技创新服务计划资助项目(cstc2012cx-rkx A70001);重庆市社科规划博士资助项目(2012BS45)

摘　　要：文章选取2004年至2011年家族上市公司为初始样本,以外聘职业经理CEO为基准,比较分析公司财务舞弊发生后家族CEO更换情况,检验家族CEO更换是否具有明显的壕沟效应,力图找到影响我国家族上市公司财务舞弊事件频发的深层原因。研究发现,上市公司家族CEO舞弊后更换比例显著高于职业经理CEO;并且,我国家族公司也没有采用为保留家族CEO而更换公司CFO的"替罪羊策略"。文章进一步研究发现,我国家族上市公司多数家族CEO兼任董事长,两职兼任的家族CEO在财务舞弊后的更换比例又显著高于其他类型的CEO。这表明在牢固掌控公司控制权的前提下,舞弊后更换家族CEO实际上是我国家族公司应对外界监管和市场压力的权宜之计,是另类"替罪羊策略"的表现。文章最后指出控制权过于集中是造成家族企业财务舞弊盛行的根本原因,并提出了解决问题的建议。Family-controlled listed companies are rising day by day in China, and they have become a force that cannot be ignored in the securities market. At the same time, some problems in the development of family firms also appear gradually, and financial fraud is one of the widely concerned problems. According to previous research especially the foreign scholar＇s research, we can consider CEOs who are family members do not bear the cost of replacement after financial fraud, and this is perhaps the important reason that family-controlled listed companies＇ financial fraud happens. But there are differences in the market environment and the institutional background between Chinese and foreign, the conclusion of study in China may be completely different with foreign research. So studying of family member CEOs＇ replacement after fraud in China＇s securities market needs in-depth discussion in theory under Chinese institutional background on one hand, and needs carrying out empirical research in a meticulous and deep-going way by using large samples on the other hand. The article uses A-share family companies listed on the Chinese stock market（excluding GEM）from 2004 to 2011 as the initial study samples, and selects family companies from 2005 to 2009 to analyze the replacement of family CEOs（in contrast with outside or hired-hand CEOs） two years after the financial fraud. The paper tries to find out the deep reasons of fraud incidents in family firms. The logistic regression model shows that the replacement ratio of family CEOs increased significantly after the financial fraud. This result indicates external market and regulatory system to some extent are threatening family finns＇ financial fraud. But in contrast with outside （hired-hand） CEOs, family CEOs＇ replacement ratio increased obviously and the find illustrates that family CEOs do not bring entrenchment effect. Meanwhile China＇s family firms also do not apply scapegoat strategy used by foreign companies to retain the founder CEO. In the fu

关 键 词：财务舞弊 家族上市公司 高管更换 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]