限定摹状词两种用法的区分及语义学两可性  

Semantic Ambiguity and Referential- Attributive Distinction of Definite Descriptions

作　　者：朱耀平[1] 钱承[1] 

机构地区：[1]苏州大学政治与公共管理学院,江苏苏州215123

出　　处：《淮阴师范学院学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第2期184-189,280,共6页Journal of Huaiyin Teachers College(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：2012年度江苏省社会科学基金项目(12ZXB009);2013年度教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(13YJA720029)

摘　　要：唐奈兰对限定摹状词的两种用法的区分引起了激烈的争论。争论的焦点集中在这种区分是否具有语义学意义这个核心问题上。首先对限定摹状词的两种不同用法的区分的语义学意义提出质疑的是克里普克,在他看来,尽管摹状词具有两种不同的用法,但只有唯一的语义学内容,即能根据罗素的摹状词理论加以分析的内容。韦茨坦反对克里普克的这种看法。他认为就摹状词的不同用法会造成无论从内容上还是从真值条件上都完全不同的两个命题来说,它们确实具有语义学上的两可性。萨蒙则站在克里普克的立场上,认为在韦茨坦的理论中包含着把某个语句表达的"说话者断言"与"语义学内容"混为一谈的"实用主义谬误"。Donellan's theory of the referential-attributive distinction of definite descriptions has given rise to intensive disputes which focus on the problem of semantic significance of that distinction. Kripke is the first one who called in question the semantic significance of referential use of descriptions. For Kripke, though a definite description may have two different kinds of uses, it has only singular significance which can be analyzed according to the rule provided by Russell's theory of descriptions. Wettstein disagreed with Kripke and maintained that the referential-attributive distinction of definite descriptions means the semantic ambiguity of related sentences. For Salmon, Wettstein has confused 'speaker's assertion' and 'semantic significance', and his theory can be regarded as a instance of 'The Pragmatic Fallacy'.

关 键 词：唐奈兰 克里普克 韦茨坦 萨蒙 限定摹状词 语义学两可性 实用主义谬误 

分 类 号：H030[语言文字—语言学]