检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
作 者:张伟[1,2]
机构地区:[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189 [2]安徽财经大学统计与应用数学学院,安徽蚌埠233030
出 处:《科技管理研究》2015年第9期105-109,共5页Science and Technology Management Research
基 金:安徽财经大学科研项目"产品差异化情形下企业的研发投入策略研究"(ACKY1420)
摘 要:考虑到含有部分私有化的公共企业、纯私营企业、合资企业的混合三寡头市场竞争,构建了混合三寡头的两阶段博弈模型,得出了企业在研发投资时各个变量的均衡解以及最优解,并分析了私有化程度、合资企业的国内控股比例对研发投入、社会福利的影响。结果表明:私有化程度的提高将会使公共企业减少研发投入,私营企业和合资企业将会增加投入;合资企业的国内控股比例的增加将会提高最优社会福利。Considering the mixed triopoly market competition containing one public finn with partial privatization, one pure private finn and one joint venture with domestic and foreign stockholders, this paper constructs a two - stage game model based on mixed triopoly, and obtains the equilibrium solution and optimal solution of each variable when finns invest in R&D. The impact of the degree of privatization and domestic stockholding of joint venture on the R&D investment and so- cial welfare are analyzed. The result shows that the R&D investment of public firm will decrease; the R&D investment of private firm and joint venture will increase along with the increasing degree of privatization; an increase in domestic stock- holding of joint venture will improve optimal social welfare.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.3