股权分置改革、会计稳健性与投资效率  

Share Segregation Reform,Accounting Conservatism and Investment Efficiency

作　　者：陈爱华[1] 

机构地区：[1]厦门国家会计学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2015年第4期7-10,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：福建省社科规划项目'福建省家族企业权力配置机制及其治理效率研究'(项目编号:2013B057);教育部人文社科基金'中国上市公司建立金融关联的动因及金融关联前后财务行为研究'(项目编号:13YJC630019)的资助

摘　　要：本文选取2000-2011年沪深A股上市公司为样本,探讨了会计稳健性与投资效率之间的关系。研究表明:会计稳健性显著抑制企业投资过度,但影响程度与企业产权性质无关;非国有企业的会计稳健性对投资不足的加剧影响更大。进一步研究发现:股改前会计稳健性对投资过度没有显著影响,但在股改后却能显著抑制投资过度;无论是股改前还是股改后,会计稳健性均加剧了投资不足。In this paper,we use 2000-2011 A-shares listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as samples,and firstly discuss the relationship between accounting conservatism and investment efficiency basing on the share segregation reform,The results show that accounting conservatism significantly inhibit corporate overinvest,but not to the extent of the impact of the enterprise's ownership.However,accounting conservatism of non-state enterprises exacerbates underinvestment more.Further studies show accounting conservatism have no significant impact on overinvestment before the share segregation reform,but significantly inhibit excessive investment after the share segregation reform.Either before or after the share segregation reform,accounting conservatism exacerbates underinvestment.

关 键 词：股权分置改革 会计稳健性 投资过度 投资不足 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]