从个体理性到交往理性:东海铸锻担保圈风险的形成和化解  

From Individual Rationality to Communicative Rationality:Risk Formation and Mitigation of Donghai Cast Guarantee Circle

作　　者：刘贤军[1] 王银光[1] 黄启龙[1] 汪易易[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行聊城市中心支行,山东聊城253000

出　　处：《金融发展研究》2015年第4期66-70,共5页Journal Of Financial Development Research

摘　　要：交往主体作为"经济人",在市场的博弈过程中,追逐自身利益最大化是个体理性的选择,但在日常经济活动中,个体理性往往导致集体非理性结局。本文运用哈贝马斯的"交往理性"理论剖析了山东省聊城市东海铸锻破产案,在政府主导或外部力量适度干预下,通过谈判磋商,最终促进多家银行与企业达到交往理性的均衡状态,并据此提出了相关风险处置的顶层设计。Communication subjects as the economic man chase benefits maximization,which are the choice of in-dividual rationality. While individual rationality is always not achieved instead of communicative rationality finally. In this paper,Habermas theory of communicative rationality and the bankrupt case of Donghai cast in Liaocheng are com-bined to analyze. It describes how individual rationality reaches equilibrium of communicative rationality, and then points that government leading or moderate intervention of external forces are helpful to reduce the prisoner’s dilemma through consultations,so as to realize the optimal allocation of social resources. At last,it puts forward a new idea of top-level design for reducing credit risk fundamentally.

关 键 词：个体理性 交往理性 担保圈 风险化解 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]