论权利与社会空间——基于实践哲学的权利二元论反思与重释  

Relation between the Right and the Social Space——The reflection and reinterpretation of the rights dualism based on the practice philosophy

作　　者：朱垭梁[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学法学院,江苏南京210093 [2]江苏开放大学文法学院,江苏南京210036

出　　处：《河北法学》2015年第5期2-21,共20页Hebei Law Science

摘　　要：既有的权利学说是视角主义的,分别从主体、客体和社会性这三个要素对权利展开分析。视角主义权利学说在方法论上是以部分去解释整体,因而对权利本质的解说是不完整的。视角主义的本体论缺陷是导致权利的主客体二元分立。在逻辑上,权利主客体二元论和视角主义的克服可以借助于实践哲学一元论及其社会空间理论。社会空间这一范畴可以对权利作出整体性阐释并且能对主客体二元论权利学说给予合理回应。权利本质的整体性解释应当是社会空间。The existing right theories launch their points on three elements： subject, object, and sociality. They explain the whole with the part, so the essence of the right cant be grasped. The defect of these theories is that they would cause the splitting of the right as subject and object. In logic, we can overcome these defects by using the monism of the practice philosophy and the theory of social theory. Social space can make an overall interpretation of rights and can give a reasonable response to the subject and object dualism right theory. The nature of right is the social space.

关 键 词：权利 空间 实践哲学 二元论 方法论 

分 类 号：DF03[政治法律—法学理论]