管理层监督对激励与风险关系影响的实证研究  

Empirical Research on the Impact of Supervision on the Relationship Between Incentives and Risk

作　　者：翟艳[1] 黄解宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]运城学院经济管理系,山西运城044000

出　　处：《经济问题》2015年第5期90-95,共6页On Economic Problems

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA790050)

摘　　要：经典代理理论认为,激励和风险之间存在权衡关系,经深入分析发现事实并非总是如此。由于企业所有者控制企业管理层存在监督和激励两项基本措施,随着风险的加大,监督成本和激励成本都会加大,所有者控制措施的选择取决于两种成本的比较。激励与风险之间的关系曲线,由于受到监督的制约,两者并非负线性关系。基于我国上市公司样本的实证研究结果表明,我国上市公司管理层补偿与风险之间存在倒"U"形关系,管理层补偿绩效弹性与风险之间存在倒"U"形关系。同时,监督对我国上市公司管理层补偿存在负向影响,这种负向影响随着风险的逐步增大而加强。Classical agency theory shows there is a trade-off relationship between incentive and risk.However, It is not always true.Firstly, because there are two basic measures including incentive and supervision when owners take measure to control the management, and incentive cost and supervision cost will increase with the increased risk, the choose of owners depends on the comparison of the incentive cost and supervision cost.Secondly, the re-lationship between incentives and risk curves is not negative linear due to the constraints of supervision.Based on the Chinese listed company sample empirical study found that, there exists the inverted “U” shape between man-agement compensation and risk in the listed company of our country, and there exists the inverted“U” shape rela-tionship between management compensation performance flexibility and risk.At the same time, supervision of listed company of our country have a negative effect on executive compensation, and this kind of negative effect will in-crease along with the risk.

关 键 词：监督 激励 风险 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]