研发溢出效应下的闭环供应链专利授权经营策略  

The Strategy of Patent Authorization of Closed-loop Supply Chain under R&D Spillover Effect

作　　者：高鹏[1] 聂佳佳[2] 陆玉梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏理工学院商学院,江苏常州213001 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第10期155-160,165,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"再制造产品供应链的销售渠道选择和广告策略研究"(71101120);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目"信息分享对回收再制造闭环供应链的影响"(10YJC630183)

摘　　要：研究由一个OEM和一个IR组成的专利授权型闭环供应链,双方分别开展技术研发活动并存在溢出效应。建立并求解了三阶段闭环供应链独立研发和合作研发博弈模型,采用灵敏度分析和数值仿真对结果进行了分析。研究表明:双方研发投资额与再制造节约成本之间的关系取决于对方研发投资成本的大小;合作研发下的研发投资额高于独立研发模式,OEM和供应链整体利润始终高于独立研发,大多数情况下IR的利润低于独立研发模式。This paper analyzes patent authorization strategy of closed - loop supply chain composed by one Original Equip- ment Manufacturer and one Independent Remanufaeturer who are developing technology R＆D activities of spillover effects. An independent and cooperative R＆D game model in three - stage closed - loop supply chain is established and solved and the result is studied by derivation method and sensitivity analysis. The study shows that the relationship between a member＇ s R＆D investment and remanufacturing saving cost depends on the investment cost of the other member. In the R＆D invest- ment, the profit of OEM and supply chain in cooperative mode is higher than that in independent mode while the profit of IR is lower than that in most cases.

关 键 词：合作研发投资 溢出效应 闭环供应链 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]