基于KMV模型的地方政府性债务违约风险分析——以长三角地区为例  被引量:26

Default Risk Assessment of Local Government Debt Based on KMV Model—Taking Yangtze River Delta Region for Example

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作  者:王学凯[1] 黄瑞玲[1] 

机构地区:[1]中共江苏省委党校世界经济与政治教研部,210009

出  处:《上海经济研究》2015年第4期62-69,共8页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基  金:江苏省社会科学基金课题"江苏地方政府性债务风险防控研究"(项目编号:14SZB026);江苏省教育厅项目"江苏新型城镇化可持续融资机制研究"(项目编号:2013DZIXM012)的阶级性成果

摘  要:该文根据公布的地方政府性债务审计报告数据,利用GM(1,1)模型预测地方财政收入,由此计算出可担保地方财政收入的增长率和波动率,并将其代入KMV模型,评价长三角地区的地方政府性债务的违约风险,结论是:(1)长三角地区的地方政府性债务违约风险仅为1.24%,总体而言风险可控;(2)地方政府性债务违约风险存在地区差异,上海的违约风险最小,江苏次之,浙江的违约风险最大;(3)在结构合理的情况下,江苏和浙江应适当缩减地方政府债务规模,上海则可少量增加地方政府性债务的规模。在此基础上,提出如下建议:(1)构建可持续税收体系,稳健地提高财政收入;(2)严格控制地方政府债务增量,分类管理地方债存量;(3)积极优化地方债期限结构,调整地方政府收支结构。According to the audit report of local government debt, the paper predicts local fiscal revenue by GM(1,1) model, and calculates growth rate and volatility of guaranteed local fiscal revenue, then assesses default risk of Yangtze River Delta region's local government debt with KMV model. Three conclusions have been made. Firstly, default risk of local government debt is only 1. 24%, which means a controllable condition in this area. Secondly, there are differences among different provinces' default risk, of which Shanghai has the least risk, Jiangsu follows Shanghai, but Zhejiang~ s default risk is a little big. Thirdly, given a reasonable structure, Jiangsu and Zhejiang need cut government debt down, but Shanghai may get a appropriate increase. As a result, the paper proposes correspondent suggestions. At first, the government need enhance fiscal revenue in a steady growth rate with building sustainable tax system. Then, scale of debt should be prevented and stock debt should be managed by different categories. Last but not least, structural adjustment will help to reduce default risk.

关 键 词:违约风险 地方政府性债务 KMV模型 GM(1 1)模型 

分 类 号:F812.5[经济管理—财政学]

 

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