媒体负面报道能有效监督高管薪酬吗——基于薪酬替代视角的实证分析  

Do Negative Coverage Effectively Supervise Managers' Compensation——An Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Compensation Substitution

作　　者：张玮倩[1] 曲延英[1] 郑迎飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,上海201620

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2015年第6期69-81,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71303153);上海市教委科研创新项目(14YS100);"2014上海高校青年教师培养资助计划"项目

摘　　要：基于薪酬替代的视角探究媒体负面报道对高管薪酬的监督影响作用。在搜集大量媒体负面报道数据进行模型检验后发现:(1)媒体负面报道会促使高管货币性薪酬下降,但同时高管在职消费上升,对高管持股影响不显著;(2)媒体负面报道后高管货币性薪酬与在职消费的总和不降反升,进一步检验在职消费对货币性薪酬的替代作用后发现,媒体负面报道后在职消费对货币性薪酬的替代增加;(3)相比于持股,高管更倾向于选择增加在职消费来替代货币性薪酬的下降。本文的研究结论说明,媒体作为上市公司外部监督的有效方式,能在一定程度上影响上市公司高管薪酬契约,但要从根源上解决高管薪酬过高或激励无效的问题,还需要政府机构介入和行政立法来完善。From the perspective of compensation substitution, this paper investigates the effect role of negative media coverage on managers＇ compensation. After collecting large number of negative media coverage on managers＇ compensation, we document that, after negative media coverage on managers＇ compensation, managers＇ cash compensation will decrease, but managers＇ perks will increase, and managers＇ shares have no change. After negative media coverage on managers＇ compensation, the total of cash compensation and perks will increase, it means that managers ask more perks to substitute the decreasing of cash compensation. Compared with managers＇ shares, managers are more likely to increase perks to substitute cash compensation. According our paper, media coverage is an effective way to improve the public companies＇ corporate governance and it can play an important role on managers＇ compensation contract, but we also need the intervention of government agencies and other legislation.

关 键 词：负面报道 货币性薪酬 高管持股 在职消费 薪酬替代 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]