股权激励、控股股东与股权资本成本  

Equity Incentive,Controlling Shareholder and Cost of Equity Capital

作　　者：邹颖[1,2] 汪平[1,2] 张丽敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]山东财经大学公司财务研究中心,山东济南250014

出　　处：《经济管理》2015年第6期98-109,共12页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：北京社科规划重点项目"资本成本测算及其应用领域研究"(15JGA010);北京市属高等学校高层次人才引进与培养计划项目之青年拔尖人才项目"基于资本成本锚定效应的公司财务政策优化研究"(CIT&TCD201304139)

摘　　要：科学高效的股权激励机制可以最大限度地降低股权资本成本,增加企业价值,这是股权激励制度设计的基本目标之一。本文研究发现,与未实施股权激励的公司相比,实施股权激励的中国公司的股权资本成本更高,股权激励没有起到应有的公司治理效用,反而造成了管理层对股东财富的侵占;国家控股对于股权激励没有发挥正向作用,降低国家股东控股比例有助于抑制股权激励程度对股权资本成本的提升效应;非国家控股公司实施适度的股权激励可以在一定程度上降低股权资本成本。如何在我国国家股东占据主体的背景之下优化股权激励机制,保护投资者利益,确保企业可持续发展,依然是一个重大课题。The objective of equity incentive is to encourage management in the form of equity to implement managerial behavior from the point of shareholders, and alleviate or even eliminate the agency conflicts between shareholders and management, and then to lay the foundation for the realization of the goal of maximizing sharehold- ers＇ wealth. A scientific and effective equity incentive mechanism must combine the interests of executives and shareholders＇ wealth consistently, and timely adjust with the change of the requirements of shareholders＇ inter- ests. In other words, it is to achieve the interests of the shareholders and to satisfy shareholders＇ requirements that is the basic standard of equity incentive. Based on the goal of shareholders＇ wealth maximization, one of the basic goals of equity incentive system is to reduce the cost of equity capital and enhance the corporate value. The cost of equity capital therefore becomes the core parameter in the designing of executive equity incentive mechanism. Using the data of listed companies in China during the period from 2006 to 2013, this paper examines the im- pact of equity incentive on cost of equity capital, and further analyzes the different cost of equity capital effect of eq- uity incentive under different controlling shareholders. The study shows：（ 1 ） compared with the companies that not implement equity incentive, the cost of equity capital is higher for Chinese companies that implement equity incen- tive. That is, the equity incentive system encroaches the shareholders＇ wealth instead of plays an effective corporate governance effect. Moreover, the greater the implement degree of equity incentive, the higher the cost of equity cap- ital. （2） State holding doesn＇ t play a positive role in the equity incentive, and reducing state holding proportion would contribute to restrain the cost of equity capital promotion effect of equity incentive. Implement a moderate eq- uity incentive in non-state holding companies can reduce the cost of e

关 键 词：股权激励 控股股东 股权资本成本 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]