检索规则说明:AND代表“并且”;OR代表“或者”;NOT代表“不包含”;(注意必须大写,运算符两边需空一格)
检 索 范 例 :范例一: (K=图书馆学 OR K=情报学) AND A=范并思 范例二:J=计算机应用与软件 AND (U=C++ OR U=Basic) NOT M=Visual
机构地区:[1]南京财经大学公共管理学院,江苏南京210023 [2]武汉大学社会保障研究中心,湖北武汉430072
出 处:《财经论丛》2015年第6期11-17,共7页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71003045)
摘 要:本文利用博弈理论分析签订正规就业合同对社会救助再就业人员收入的影响效应,并经验验证签订就业合同能显著提高受助群体的收入。实证研究结果显示,签订就业合同需受助群体自身具备更高的技能。总的来看,签订就业合同的正规就业在很大程度上提高了受助群体的再就业收入。就业合同的签订及合同长期可持续发挥效力的前提是对受助群体再就业人员进行专业化的技能培训,政府可根据用人单位的属性采取购买服务的形式给予"订单式"培训。This paper uses the game theory to analyze the effect of the signing of formal employment contract on the in- come of the social relief groups and proves that the signing of formal employment contract can significantly increase the income of the social relief groups. Results from empirical studies show that the signing of formal employment contract requires the re- cipient groups possess higher skills. The premise for the signing of formal employment contract and for the contract to exert long-term sustainable effects is to offer the recipient groups professional skills training. The paper suggests that the government can adopt the method of buying service to provide "order-type" training according to the property of the employers.
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在载入数据...
正在链接到云南高校图书馆文献保障联盟下载...
云南高校图书馆联盟文献共享服务平台 版权所有©
您的IP:216.73.216.249