基于博弈分析的支线航空合作动因  

Game-Based Analysis on Motive of Regional Air Route Cooperation

作　　者：王琨[1] 朱金福[1] 朱星辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京航空航天大学民航学院,江苏南京210016

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2015年第3期557-561,共5页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171111)

摘　　要：针对支线航空因运输规模小、运营成本高导致独立运营盈利水平低的问题,运用BERTRAND博弈模型,从市场博弈的角度分析了支线航线与干线进行合作对其运营效果的影响.将支线航线分为枢纽辐射型和点对点型2种类型,根据支线至最终目的地仅有通过枢纽中转的航班和中转与直达航班并存这两种支线运营的市场情况,分别建立了支线、干线合作与不合作情况的市场结构模型,对比分析了各种市场结构达到均衡时的共同利润.研究结果表明,在2种市场情况下,支线与干线合作市场结构的共同利润均高于不合作时的共同利润,并通过算例分析进行了验证.Since the independent regional air route operates at a low level of profitability because of small transport volume and high operation cost, the BERTRAND game model was used to analyze the effect of the cooperation of the regional air route with branch air route on its operating profit from the point of market game. Regional air route was divided into two types, ＂point to point＂ and ＂hubspoke＂. Market structure models of cooperation and non-cooperation between regional air route and branch air route were built respectively for the origin-destination regional markets without point to point air route and with both point to point and hub-spoke air route. Total equilibrium profits under different market structures were compared. The results show that total profits of cooperative market structures are higher than those of noncooperation.

关 键 词：航空运输 市场影响 竞争 合作 博弈模型 

分 类 号：F560[经济管理—产业经济]