环境规制与地方政府激励模式优化  

Environmental Regulation and Local Government Incentive Model Optimization

作　　者：臧传琴[1] 刘畅 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学经济学院,山东济南250014 [2]山东省临沂市兰山区服务业管理办公室,山东临沂276000

出　　处：《山东财经大学学报》2015年第3期44-52,共9页Journal of Shandong University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：山东省社会科学规划项目"环境规制与地方政府激励模式优化研究--以山东省为例"(13CJJZ02)

摘　　要：在环境规制过程中,作为连接中央政府和被规制对象的中介,地方政府的目标选择和行为偏好很大程度上影响着中央政府环境规制政策的贯彻落实和生态环境的改善与否。文章通过对中国现有的中央政府对地方政府的激励模式进行评析,认为中国现行的行政体制——主要以经济增长率为考核指标的中央政府对地方政府的激励模式,给予了地方政府发展经济的较强激励,但却忽略了包括环境保护等公共服务的提供,使得地方政府环境保护绩效不理想。据此,提出了进一步优化地方政府激励模式的政策建议。In the process of environmental regulation, the target selection and behavioral preference of local governments which serve as a medium between the central government and the regulated objects greatly influence the implementation of the central government＇s environmental regulation policies and the improvement of the ecological environment. Based on the analysis of the current central government＇s incentive model for local governments, this paper concludes that China＇s current administrative system, an incentive model with economic growth rate as the main evaluation index, neglects providing public services such as environmental protection, resulting in local governments＇less ideal performances in environmental protection although such an administrative system exerts a stronger incentive for developing economy. And policy recommendations are accordingly offered to further optimize the incentive models for local governments.

关 键 词：环境规制 地方政府 激励机制 政策建议 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]