基于不完全信息动态博弈的投标联合体组建研究  

Researches on Construction of Bidding Alliance Based on Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information

作　　者：王文韬[1] 章恒全[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,南京211100

出　　处：《世界科技研究与发展》2015年第3期306-309,325,共5页World Sci-Tech R&D

基　　金：中央分成水资源费项目(1261320212020)资助

摘　　要：为了给投标联合体组建提供行之有效的决策分析方法,充分发挥投标联合体的技术优势,分散投资风险、降低工程成本,从成本—收益的角度对主导企业与潜在合作伙伴进行博弈分析,得到在不完全信息条件下主导企业选择潜在合作伙伴加入投标联合体的边界条件,即主导企业是否与某企业组建投标联合体取决于获得的合作收益与主导企业选择合作成本的差距,以及合作双方获得的收益与成本差异的双向作用;潜在合作伙伴是否愿意加入投标联合体,取决于博弈双方的合作收益与投入成本的比较。研究对于投标联合体的构建具有一定的理论意义,也为投标联合体的组建提供了切实有效的决策框架。In order to provide an effective decision method for the construction of bidding alliance,make full use of advanta- ges of bidding consortium, such as technological superiority, spreading investment risks, cost saving. The game between lead- ing enterprises and bidding consortium partners based on cost-benefit perspective are analyzed. The boundary condition that leading enterprises select potential partner to join the bidding consortium has been obtained in the condition of incomplete information. In other words,whether the leading enterprise establishes a bidding consortium with potential partners or not de- pends on the gap between cooperation benefit and coordination cost. Whether potential partners join the bidding consortium or not depends on the comparison between the cooperation income and the cost of investment. The study has a certain theo- retical significance for the construction of the bidding alliance.

关 键 词：投标联合体 组建 合作伙伴选择 成本—收益分析 不完全信息 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]