实践理性、公共理由与正义观念的辩护  

Practical Reason,Public Reasons and Justification for Justice

作　　者：陈肖生[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学政府管理学院,南京210023

出　　处：《南京大学学报（哲学．人文科学．社会科学）》2015年第3期129-141,159-160,共13页Journal of Nanjing University(Philosophy,Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：南京大学2014年度中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(2062014275);国家社会科学基金项目"当代西方政治哲学中的福利权问题研究"(13BZX086)

摘　　要：罗尔斯与哈贝马斯都深受康德的实践理性观念影响,试图通过契约程序或理想商谈情境去阐发被康德认为是体现了实践理性本身要求的绝对命令程序,来为理性的公共运用确立一个规范框架。他们在关于正义观念的辩护问题上的著名论争,实质是对于何种程序设置才能合理地反映一种不偏不倚的道德观点的分歧。哈贝马斯认为必须在理想商谈条件下经由公民平等讨论后在相同的公共理由之上形成的共识,才具有道德规范性;罗尔斯认为,在其对正义观念的辩护中,原初代表的"独白式"慎思并不必然会阻碍对不偏不倚道德观点的体现;并且公民基于各自的理由在正义观念上达成重叠共识,是合理多元条件下面向公民的完整统一的实践理性为正义观念作辩护的要求。Influenced by Kant's concept of practical reason,both Rawls and Habermas try to develop,through social contract procedure or ideal speech situation,Kant's categorical imperative procedure,which is regarded as the demand of the practical reason itself,so as to establish a normative framework for regulating the public use of reason. However,they have different opinions on how to set up this framework. Habermas believes that a normative consensus should be formed on the bases of the same public reasons and under the ideal debilitative conditions;whereas Rawls argues that,in the justification of justice,the original deliberation of a 'monologue'kind does not necessarily prevent the expression of the impartial moral point of view.What the citizens have achieved as a consensus,with yet incongruous concerns,is actually their requirement for a kind of public justification of complete and unified practical reason,under the condition of reasonable pluralism.

关 键 词：罗尔斯 哈贝马斯 理性 合情理性 公共理由 公共辩护 重叠共识 

分 类 号：D091[政治法律—政治学]