股权激励与上市公司投资行为——基于倾向得分配对方法的分析  

Equity Incentives and Investment Behavior of Listed Companies:An Analysis Based on Propensity Score Matching

作　　者：卢闯[1] 孙健[1] 张修平[2] 向晶薪 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [2]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《中国软科学》2015年第5期110-118,共9页China Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(14AGL010);北京市高等学校青年英才计划项目(YETP0956);国家自然科学基金青年项目(71102122);北京市教育委员会共建项目专项;北京市会计类专业群(改革试点)建设项目;中国人民大学科学研究基金(15XNH083)

摘　　要：股权激励的实施是否真的能提高经理人的风险承担水平一直是学术界的热门话题。以2006—2010年间我国宣告实施股权激励的公司为样本,采用倾向得分配对方法和双重差分模型研究股权激励对企业投资行为的影响。研究发现,实施股权激励的公司投资增长显著高于未实施股权激励的公司。进一步的,本文发现国有上市公司和经营业绩较好的上市公司的投资增长显著高于民营上市公司和经营业绩较差的上市公司。Whether the implementation of equity incentives increase the risk-taking of managers has been a popular topic of the academy. Using a sample of listed companies which had announced the implementation of equity incentives during 2006-2010, we analyze the effect of equity incentives on the listed companies＇ investment behavior with propensity score match method and difference-in-difference model. We find that the investment growth of the companies with equity incentives is significantly higher than the investment growth of companies without equity incentives. Furthermore, we find that this positive relation between equity incentives and investment growth is more significant in SOEs and companies with better performance rather than non-SOEs and companies with poor performance.

关 键 词：股权激励 投资行为 倾向得分配对 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]