企业孵化器与风险投资的融合机制——基于博弈决策模型  

Game Fusion Mechanism of Decision- making Model Technology Business Incubator and Venture Capital- based

作　　者：赵武[1] 李晓华[1] 孙永康[1] 庞加兰[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710071 [2]西安外国语大学经济金融学院,陕西西安710128

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第12期101-105,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：陕西省社科界重大理论和现实问题研究项目"丝绸之路经济带战略背景下提升陕西金融创新能力研究"(2014Z142);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划项目"包容性创新的机理与促进机制研究"(2014JM2-7134);西安市社会科学规划基金项目"西安市构建包容性创新驱动发展新格局研究"(15J39);西安市科技局软科学项目"促进西安金融资本市场发展研究"(SF1310-3)

摘　　要：科技企业孵化器能够为初创企业的发展提供管理、咨询等服务,风险投资机构凭借资金优势能够满足科技企业的研发资金需求。通过建立完全信息及信息不对称条件下的博弈决策模型,寻找双方博弈的均衡点。模型结果表明:在完全信息条件下,(融合,融合)是双方博弈的唯一纳什均衡,即合作是一种必然趋势。而在信息不对称条件下,通过建立品牌型孵化器能够部分解决信息不对称问题,减少信息搜寻成本,并同时提高合作双方的收益。Technology Business Incubator provides management and consulting services for the development of start - ups, venture capital funds with the advantages of technology to meet the needs of corporate R ＆ D funding. In this paper, through the establishment of complete information and decision - making model under asymmetricinformation game condi- tions, to find the equilibrium point of both games. Under the condition of complete information, （fusion, fusion） is the on- ly Nash equilibriumof the game both sides, that cooperation is an inevitable trend. But because in reality there is often asymmetric information, leading to both prone to moral hazard in the process of cooperation and collaboration to rupture. Therefore, under asymmetric information, the integration of both sides of the complementary advantages achieved by impro- ving the level of service both sides, build brand trust - based incubator to enhance bilateral cooperation, reduce information search costs.

关 键 词：博弈论 孵化器 风险投资 

分 类 号：F276.44[经济管理—企业管理] F832.48[经济管理—国民经济]