美诺悖论的两种消解方式——论柏拉图和伊壁鸠鲁在研究起点上的差异  

Two Ways of Resolving Meno's Paradox:On Plato and Epicurus' s Differences in the Research Starting Point

作　　者：许欢[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学哲学与社会发展学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《海南大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2015年第3期18-24,共7页Journal of Hainan University （Humanities & Social Sciences）

摘　　要：美诺悖论在认识论上的重要之处是提出了研究起点的问题,而柏拉图和伊壁鸠鲁分别提示了两种不同的研究起点:一是灵魂不朽的存在论预设,一是προλψιζ的认识论起点。两种研究起点就其自身而言,一种是本质规定,一种是经验描述。二者的根本分歧是论证实在性和感觉实在性之争,两种实在性反映了两种探究问题的途径。The significance of Meno＇ s paradox in epistemology is to put forward the issue of research starting point. However Plato and Epicurus respectively hints two different starting points. One is the ontological premi- ses of the immortality of the soul and the other the epistemological starting point of προληψιζ. In terms of their own nature, one is the definition of essence and the other the description of experience. The fundamental divi- sion between them is the dispute about the reality of argument and that of perception, and these two realities re- flect two approaches to making an inquiry.

关 键 词：美诺悖论 认识论 研究起点 柏拉图 伊壁鸠鲁 

分 类 号：B502.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]