亚里士多德论akrasia  

Aristotle's Theory on Akrasia

作　　者：谢宝贵[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州师范学院马列主义教学部,贵州贵阳550018

出　　处：《贵州师范学院学报》2015年第5期1-5,共5页Journal of Guizhou Education University

摘　　要：亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》的第七卷中讨论了akrasia即不能自制的问题。他对这个问题的讨论主要是为了试图解决苏格拉底论题提出的疑难:除非出于无知,没有人会故意犯错。苏格拉底论题否认一个人明知一个行为是不好的,却还会去做它的这样的可能性,这也就否认了不能自制的存在。在同情地理解苏格拉底论题的基础上,亚里士多德并不否认不能自制的存在,认为不能自制根源于不能自制者的欲望蒙蔽了其理性认知。亚氏对不能自制的这种理解有一定的合理之处,但显得过于片面。因此,他也没能把握到苏格拉底论题中所蕴含的深刻的洞见:很多看似不能自制的行为,其实主要缘于行动者对某些与行动相关的东西知道得不够深刻。In Volume VII of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses the problem of akrasia （ incontinence or lack of self - control）. The principal aim of this discussion is to attempt to solve the difficulty of the Socrates＇ s Thesis ： No one will deliberately do wrong unless he is ignorant of something. This thesis denies that incontinence is possible. In spite of his sympathy for Socrates＇ s thesis, Aristotle does not deny incontinent actions, and thinks that incontinent actions root in some desires of the incontinent beclouding their reason. While this account of inconti- nence makes some sense, it does not seem to be sound. Thus, Aristotle does not grasp the deep insight in Socra- tes＇ s thesis ： many actions which seem incontinent were done mainly due to agents＇ lacking of deeply knowing a- bout something which has to do with the actions.

关 键 词：亚里士多德 不能自制 知 深知 有感之知 

分 类 号：B502.233[哲学宗教—外国哲学]