国有股留存控制权、政治联系与企业投资效率  

Residual State Ownership, Political Ties and Investment Efficiency

作　　者：李辉[1] 白云朴[2] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127 [2]南京邮电大学,江苏南京210023

出　　处：《未来与发展》2015年第6期60-67,共8页Future and Development

基　　金：陕西省社科基金项目(项目编号:2014D02);陕西省教育厅基金项目(项目编号:14JK1705);西北大学2013年度科研基金人文社科类项目(项目编号:13NW16)

摘　　要：中国国有企业改革没有实行大规模的民营化,而是通过在资本市场上增发股票实施部分民营化,政府主要通过国有股留存控制权和任命有政治联系的高管来控制企业,实现对企业投资活动的干预。这种模式对企业投资效率产生了何种影响?选取2001-2012年沪深两地上市国有企业为样本,研究了股权部分民营化模式下国有股留存控制权和政治联系对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现:国有股留存控制权和政治联系单一因素对企业投资效率的影响为负,两者的交互作用对企业投资效率具有正向影响。研究结论对中国国有企业股权部分民营化的实践具有一定的借鉴意义,政府可以通过保留大量国有股权且任命具有政治联系的高管来控制企业,进而提升企业投资效率。China’s state-owned enterprises reform is not large privatization, but through the capital market to raise equity to implement partial privatization, the government mainly through retained control of state-owned shares and the appointment of executives having political ties to control enterprises and control the enterprise’s investment activity. The model has what impact on enterprise’s investment efficiency？ Selecting listed state-owned enterprises from 2001 to 2012 as samples, the paper studies the affect of retained control of state-owned shares and political ties to corporate investment efficiency. Study finds that：state-owned shares retained control and political ties single influence on enterprise’s investment efficiency is negative. The interaction of both has a positive effect. The conclusion has significant reference to the practice of privatization. The government can retain a large number of state-owned shares and appoint executives to control enterprises, and then raise investment efficiency.

关 键 词：国有股留存控制权 政治联系 投资效率 

分 类 号：F272.9[经济管理—企业管理]