双渠道供应链博弈模型的复杂性分析  

Complexity analysis of game model in a dual channel supply chain

作　　者：张芳[1] 张婷婷[1] 马小林[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津工业大学理学院,天津300387

出　　处：《天津工业大学学报》2015年第3期78-84,共7页Journal of Tiangong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61273231)

摘　　要：提出了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链博弈模型,研究了集中决策和分散决策2种决策下的静态和动态博弈模型,分析了静态模型下零售渠道的渠道忠诚度对定价决策的影响,并利用稳定域图、分岔图、最大Lyapunov指数图研究了动态模型的复杂动力学性质.研究结果表明:零售价与零售渠道忠诚度成正比,直销价与零售渠道忠诚度成反比;分散决策下的零售价格大于集中决策下零售价格;集中决策下,整体供应链能够获得更大的利润.We consider a dual channel supply chain （CLSC）, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. We characterize the static and dynamic game models in a centralized and a decentralized dual channel supply chain. Then, we evaluate the influence of the degree of retail channel loyalty on pricing decision under the static model. Through numerical simulation, we analyze the complex dynamic phenomena , such as the stability region, chaos, bifurcation diagram and the largest Lyapunov exponent diagram. We find that the retail channel loyalty has a positive effect on the retail price and an inversus effect on the direct price;the retail price in decentralized supply chain is greater than that in centralized supply chain;the whole supply chain can get more profits under centralized decision.

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 博弈模型 渠道忠诚度 定价 混沌 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]