三方相互威慑讨价还价模型  

A Bargaining Model of Mutual Deterrence Between Three Players

作　　者：龚智强[1] 谢政[1] 戴丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]国防科学技术大学理学院数学与系统科学系,湖南长沙410073

出　　处：《经济数学》2015年第2期87-92,共6页Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：国防科技大学科研计划项目(JC14-02-10)

摘　　要：研究了三方相互威慑讨价还价问题,从合作博弈的角度建立了三方相互威慑讨价还价模型.并且通过对均衡存在性和冲突可能性的分析,给出了三方相互威慑问题冲突发生的条件以及存在均衡状态时的均衡解.最后通过实验验证了本文分析的正确性.In this paper we study the problem of mutual deterrence and build a bargaining model of mutual deterrence between three players through cooperation game and the bargaining model built by Rubinstein. And through the analysis of the credibility of deterrence and the probability of conflict, the conditions which cause the occurrence of the conflict between the players and the equilibrium of the problem if it exists have been given in the paper. Finally, the validity of the analysis is veri- fied by experiment.

关 键 词：博弈论 折损因子 讨价还价 相互威慑 NASH均衡 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]