地方官员自由裁量权与企业寻租花费  

Discretion of local bureaucrat and the firm's cost of rent-seeking

作　　者：徐雷[1] 

机构地区：[1]渤海大学管理学院,辽宁锦州121013

出　　处：《渤海大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第2期161-167,共7页Journal of Bohai University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(No:13YJC790167);辽宁省社科基金青年项目(No:L13CGL022);辽宁省教育厅人文社科项目(No:W2014171)

摘　　要：通过一个数学模型分析了地方官员自由裁量权对企业寻租花费和社会福利的影响,对官员自身偏好、官员对微观经济的控制程度,企业家行为效率,企业家对制度环境和行业背景的理解力等方面进行了研究.研究结论显示,要减少地方官员寻租行为,提高企业生产积极性,提升社会福利水平应提高政绩在官员晋升中的决定作用,加大行政审批改革力度,制定权力清单减少官员对市场的不必要干预,同时提高政府行为透明度.In this paper, a mathematical model used to analysis the effects of the local officials discretion on rent-seeking cost of the firms and the social welfare.We also analysis the officials′preference, control of the microeconomic level, efficiency of entrepreneurial behavior, entrepreneurs comprehension of institution environ-ment and industry background, etc, and we find that to reduce rent-seeking behavior, improve enterprise pro-duction enthusiasm, improve the social welfare level should improve the achievements in the official promotion decision role, we will intensify reform of administrative examination and approval, making power officials listing to reduce unnecessary intervention in the market, at the same time improve the transparency of the government behavior.

关 键 词：官员 自由裁量权 寻租 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]