内部治理机制与自由现金流代理成本的研究  

The Research of Internal Governance Mechanism and the Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow

作　　者：张倩[1] 陈辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学

出　　处：《财务与金融》2015年第3期39-42,52,共5页Accounting and Finance

摘　　要：由于现在上市公司存在两权分离的状况,企业持有自由现金流量会产生一定的代理成本问题。为了抑制其产生的代理成本,本文在自由现金流量理论的基础上,从企业内部治理机制出发,选取我国深沪A股的上市公司为样本研究企业内部治理机制与自由现金流量代理成本的关系,希望通过改善内部治理机制合理控制自由现金流量,从而降低其代理成本。Because the separation of ownership and control in modem company, the company holds large amounts of free cash flow will cause the agency problem between them. In order to prevent the agency cost of production, on the basis of free cash flow theory and internal governance mechanism in enterprises, this paper uses finaneial data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies as the sample to test the relationship between internal governance mechanism and agency cost of free cash flow. The authors hope to control the free cash flow and reduce the agency cost from improving the internal governance mechanism.

关 键 词：自由现金流量 代理成本 内部治理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]