房地产开发与地方政府寻租:策略抉择的扩展式博弈  

Extensive-form Game Theory on Real Estate Development and Rent Seeking

作　　者：蒋红[1] 

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《浙江工商职业技术学院学报》2015年第2期20-24,共5页Journal of Zhejiang Business Technology Institute

基　　金：2012年广西研究生科研创新项目"房屋使用过程中土地增值多元主体行为研究"(编号YCSW2012067)阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：探讨寻租活动中多元主体的博弈行为及其治理策略。采用扩展式博弈或博弈树方法。结果表明:构建了寻租活动中多元主体的扩展式博弈模型,识别了两种不种情况下多元主体寻租博弈的关键策略。可以发现在房地产开发领域的寻租治理方面,不仅要合理引导开发商等多元主体的市场行为,还要利用中央政府的调控政策来治理地方政府的寻租行为,其最重要的就是实施以引入奖惩机制为主的调控政策,提高中央政府治理寻租活动的强度和效率。The purpose of this paper is to explore the behaviors＇ mechanism of rent seeking activities by the multiple subjects and to thereby propose the management strategy. Extensive-form game theory is introduced to probe into this problem. This paper argued that there are conflicts among the multiple subjects in the rent seeking activities. In order to explore their key strategies in two different situations, this paper has built an extensive-form game model of the multiple subjects. The disposal of rent seeking in the field of real estate, should not only guide the market behavior of real estate developers and the multiple subjects, but also needs to rectify the rent seeking action of the local government. In order to improve the intensity and efficiency of the disposal of rent seeking, it is necessary to implement the regulatory policy based on the reward and punishment mechanism by the central government in China.

关 键 词：扩展式博弈 寻租活动 房地产开发 

分 类 号：F123[经济管理—世界经济]