软件外包客户与提供商信任策略选择的演化博弈分析  

Analysis of an evolutionary game on trust strategy selection between software outsourcing clients and outsourcing providers

作　　者：仲秋雁[1] 赵鹏[1] 赵彬[1] 

机构地区：[1]大连理工大学管理科学与工程学院,辽宁大连116024

出　　处：《科技与管理》2015年第3期71-75,共5页Science-Technology and Management

摘　　要：软件外包客户与提供商之间的信任是影响外包项目成功的重要因素之一。根据合作过程中不完全信息、合作双方有限理性的特点,使用演化博弈的方法构建了客户信任策略和提供商配合策略选择的演化博弈模型,并分析了双方在策略选择过程中的互动情况。结果表明:外包提供商消极配合给客户带来的损失、外包客户监控成本、外包客户采取信任策略给提供商带来的收益或惩罚会直接影响博弈结果,合作双方策略选择的演化情况存在3种稳定状态,根据分析结果提出了相应建议。Trust between software outsourcing clients and outsourcing providers is one of the most important issues on outsourcing success. This paper establishes a mixed-strategy game model between outsourcing clients＇ trust strategy and outsourcing providers＇ cooperation strategy based on the characteristics of incomplete information and bounded rationality of both parties. It further examines the interaction between outsourcing clients and providers in the process of making choices. The result shows that the costs on clients from providers, clients＇ monitoring costs, the benefits and punishments on providers from clients directly affect the game results. Three evolutionary stable strategies exist under certain conditions. At last, the corresponding suggestions are put forward according to the resuits.

关 键 词：演化博弈 演化稳定策略 软件外包 信任 配合 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]