中央政策的决策者与目标群体之博弈——以退耕还林政策为例  

The Competition Between Central Government Policy Makers and Target Groups of the Policies:A Case Study of the Grain for Green Policy

作　　者：姚贱苟[1] 

机构地区：[1]广西师范大学政治与行政学院,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《广西师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第3期44-49,共6页Journal of Guangxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家民委青年项目"少数民族地区农村公共服务均等化实现的责任机制研究"(2014-GM-078);广西高等学校科研项目一般资助项目"民族地区基本公共服务均等化的实现机制研究"(201203YB026);广西师范大学校级青年基金项目"政策执行的博弈论分析";广西社会科学重点课题"县级民生财政的实现机制"(gxsk201412)

摘　　要：中央政策的决策者与政策调整对象的目标群体在政策执行中面临资源的稀缺性,双方存在利益相对独立性,致使博弈的合作往往短暂,博弈的不合作则为常态。退耕还林政策的中央决策者与目标群体表现为囚徒困境和性别之战的两种不合作博弈,前者源于背弃是最优化的主导策略,后者源于收益差别从而协调难成,使集体理性处于困境。综合两种博弈类型与结构,要改变不合作博弈图景,实现合作下的集体理性,须创制第三方制约力量、完善信息沟通机制、健全政策体系。There are two problems that central government policy makers and target groups of the policy face：the scarcity of resources and the relative independence of interests.There problems often result in short-term cooperation but long-term non-cooperation in the game.Prisoner＇s dilemma and gender difference are the two non-cooperation games between decision-makers of central government in the ＂grain for green＂ policy and target groups of the policy.The former game is caused by the opinion that abandoning is the optimal strategy,and the latter results from the idea that it is so hard to coordinate the differences of interests of different genders that the rationality of both genders gets into dilemma.Given the types and structures of the two games,in order to change the pattern of non-cooperation games and achieve the goal of collective rationality,it is necessary to introduce the power restriction of the third party to improve the mechanism of information communication and to make a sound policy system.

关 键 词：中央政策 目标群体 退耕还林 囚徒困境 性别之战 第三方制约 

分 类 号：B63-31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]