双边道德风险下SaaS供应链质量担保契约设计  

Quality Guaranty Contract Design of SaaS Supply Chain under Double Moral Hazard

作　　者：严建援[1] 甄杰[1,2] 张甄妮 

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]奥卢大学信息技术与电子工程学院,奥卢90014

出　　处：《软科学》2015年第7期118-124,共7页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172072)

摘　　要：运用委托代理理论在双边道德风险条件下从供应链管理的视角分别构建了基于内部质量检测的担保契约和基于外部故障检测的担保契约,并对两种质量担保契约对Saa S供应链的协调效果进行验证及对比分析。研究结果表明,基于外部故障检测的担保契约只有在故障检测不会错误地判定软件开发商所承担的质量担保责任时才能实现供应链的协调,而基于内部质量检测的担保契约无需约束条件便可实现供应链协调;以Saa S提供商期望收益最大化作为决策标准,基于内部质量检测的担保契约优于基于外部故障检测的担保契约。This paper constructs two types of quality guaranty contract based on internal quality inspection and external fault detection,which were designed with the principal-agent theory respectively from the perspective of supply chain management under double moral hazard. Besides,the coordination effect of these two kinds of quality guaranty contract were verified and compared. Result shows that quality guaranty contract based on external fault detection could coordinate the supply chain in the premise of fault detection would not judge the responsibility taken by software vendor incorrectly,while quality guaranty contract based on internal quality inspection,could coordinate the supply chain without any premise. Furthermore,quality guaranty contract based on internal quality inspection is better than its counterpart based on external fault detection according to profit maximization of Saa S provider.

关 键 词：双边道德风险 SaaS供应链 质量担保契约 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]