考虑零售商风险态度的绿色供应链契约协调模型  

Contract and Game Models of Green Supply Chain with Risk-averse Retailer

作　　者：江世英[1,2] 马春艳[3] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054 [2]湖北汽车工业学院经济管理学院,湖北十堰442002 [3]湖北汽车工业学院电气与信息工程学院,湖北十堰442002

出　　处：《工业工程》2015年第3期30-35,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金资助项目(13YJCZH061);湖北省教育厅科学技术研究项目(Q20141804);湖北省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目(14G255);湖北汽车工业学院博士科研启动基金(BK201204)

摘　　要：以风险中性制造商和风险规避零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,考虑风险规避度和产品绿色度等因素,建立了集中决策博弈模型和制造商领导Stackelberg博弈模型。比较了两博弈模型中,产品绿色度、转移价格、产品价格与风险规避度的相互影响,以及风险规避度对制造商利润和零售商效用的影响。研究表明:(1)在集中决策模型中,零售商的单位产品利润和总利润均为零;(2)在制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中,随着零售商风险规避度的提高,产品价格会逐渐降低;制造商领导的Stackelberg博弈模型中的转移价格大于集中决策模型中的转移价格;(3)收益共享契约能够协调绿色供应链。Based on a two-stage green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game models and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established. Comparing the two game models, interaction of product greenness, wholesale prices, product prices and risk aversion and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also discussed. Finally, the reve- nue sharing contract is used to coordinate the green supply chain. Results： In a centralized decision-mak- ing model, the retailer＇s profit per unit and gross profit of products are zero ; in the manufacturer-led Stack- elberg game model, product price will be gradually reduced along with retailers improving the degree of risk aversion; the transfer price in the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model is greater than that in cen- tralized decision-making model; and there are revenue sharing coefficients so that the manufacturer-led green supply chain and the retailer-led green supply chain can be coordinated.

关 键 词：风险规避度 绿色供应链 产品绿色度 博弈模型 收益共享契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]