并购重组过程中的信息泄露与财富转移  

Information Leakage and Wealth Transfer Effect in Merge & Acquisition

作　　者：薛健[1] 窦超[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《金融研究》2015年第6期189-206,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(项目批准号71322201和71272025)的资助

摘　　要：本文利用机构与个人投资者的持仓比例数据,分析检验了并购重组中存在的信息泄露问题与财富转移效应。实证结果表明,上市公司首次披露并购重组公告前,存在严重的信息泄露现象,机构投资者在交易时机与交易对象的选择上都明显占有优势,直接导致了不同投资者间出现显著的财富转移效应。进一步的分析还发现,信息泄露的现象在机构投资者持股比例较高的公司更容易出现,而在分析师关注程度较高、资产规模较大的公司则较少出现。这些发现有助于人们了解并购过程中存在的信息泄露现象,辩证地看待机构投资者所扮演的角色,并探寻了信息泄露在不同类型企业中存在的可能性,这对改进监管层政策法规、规范企业信息披露制度以及保护中小投资者利益都有着重要的启示作用。This paper tries to test the relationship between information leakage and wealth transfer effect in merge ＆ acquisition based on the Topview data. The results show that before the disclosure of M＆A, institutional investors can always buy more and better stocks in advance. Moreover, institutional investors could take advantage of leaked information to get positive earnings, while individual investors will suffer a loss. In addition, firms with more institutional investors before M＆A are more likely to have information leakage, while firms with more analyst followings and larger scale are less likely to face this problem. Overall, the information leakage before M＆A results in wealth transfer effect between various investors, and the results help us better understand the role of the institutional investors and how leaked information would influence investors＇ behavior.

关 键 词：并购重组 信息泄露 财富转移 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51