会计信息质量、终极控制人与资本配置效率  

Accounting Information Quality,Ultimate Controller and Capital Allocation Efficiency

作　　者：张波涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2015年第6期3-7,129,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目"会计信息与资源配置效率研究"(项目编号:71132004)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文以沪深两市2007-2013年A股上市公司为研究对象,分析了会计信息质量对我国上市公司资本配置效率的影响,检验了在不同终极控制人性质和行政级别情况下会计信息质量对企业资本配置效率影响的差异。研究发现:高质量的会计信息可以有效的提升上市公司资本配置效率;上市公司终极控制人性质对会计信息质量与资本配置效率的关系会产生重要的影响,即相对于政府控制上市公司而言,会计信息质量对非政府控制的上市公司资本配置效率的推动作用更强;会计信息质量对不同行政级别政府控制的企业资本配置效率影响的差异并不显著。Using data of A-share companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the period 2007—2013,we examine the impact of the quality of accounting information on capital allocation efficiency in China's listed firms.We test the differences in the impact of accounting information quality on the firm's capital allocation efficiency under different administrative levels and the nature of ultimate controller.Results show that:high quality accounting information can effectively improve capital allocation efficiency in Chinese listed firms;the nature of firm's ultimate controller has an important impact on the relationship between accounting information quality and capital allocation efficiency.That is,relative to the non-government—controlled listed firms,the quality of accounting information better promotes capital allocation efficiency in non-government—controlled firms.The differences in the impact of accounting information quality on government-controlled listed firms' capital allocation efficiency in different administrative levels is insignificant.

关 键 词：资本配置效率 会计信息质量 终极控制人性质 终极控制人行政级别 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]