创业板高管激励契约组合、融资约束与创新投入  

Management Incentive Contract Combination, Financial Constraints and Innovation Investment in GEM Companies

作　　者：胡艳[1] 马连福[2] 

机构地区：[1]四川师范大学商学院,四川成都610068 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2015年第8期78-90,共13页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372093);教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(10JJD63001);教育部人文社科青年基金项目(12YJC630061);四川省哲学社科项目(SC14C037);四川省教育厅重点项目(14SA0013)

摘　　要：以2010~2012年创业板公司为样本,实证研究高管激励组合、融资约束与创新投入的关系。结果表明：高管薪酬与创新投入正相关,股权激励与创新投入呈倒U型关系;当高管持股较低时,会推动创新投入来追求＂身份认同＂,随着持股数量的增加,＂确定性收益＂发挥主导作用,高管不愿承担更多的创新风险;控制权激励和股权激励存在替代效应;融资约束与创新投入负相关,受融资约束的影响,高管薪酬与创新投入之间的正相关关系被抑制。Using the balanced Panel Data from 2010-2012 of the companies listed on Growth Enterprises Market（GEM）, this paper theoretically analyzed and empirically tested correlations among management incentive, financial constraints and innovation investment. The result shows that the more management salary the enterprise has, the more innovation investment. There is the inverted u-shaped relationship between equity incentive and innovation investment. When the proportion of managerial ownership is low, the pursuit of ＂identity＂ will promote them to invest innovation; with the amount of shares increased, the ＂wealth effect＂ played more obviously, executives will turn to think about how to maintain the present value, rather than taking more risk of innovation. There is a substitute relationship between equity incentive and control rights. Meanwhile, the more financial constraints an enterprise has, the less RD investment.Influenced by financing constraints, the positive correlation between salary incentive and innovation investment is inhibited.

关 键 词：创业板公司 高管激励 融资约束 创新投入 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]