掏空、合谋与股权制衡——基于博弈的分析视角  

Tunneling,Collusion and Stock Ownership Check-and-balance:Based on the Perspective of Game Theory

作　　者：罗昆[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]安徽建筑大学发展规划处,安徽合肥230601 [2]华东师范大学商学院,上海200241

出　　处：《南京审计学院学报》2015年第4期89-95,共7页journal of nanjing audit university

基　　金：2014年安徽省教育厅人文社会科学研究项目重点课题(SK2014A207)

摘　　要：通过构建第一大股东与其他大股东之间的博弈模型,考察大股东之间的掏空、合谋与股权制衡关系,研究发现:提高其他大股东的监督效率、降低监督成本有利于抑制第一大股东的掏空行为;加大对第一大股东掏空行为的惩罚力度有助于强化其他大股东对第一大股东的股权制衡;法律对中小股东保护的程度越强,其他大股东越有可能选择监督行为,第一大股东实施掏空行为被发现的概率也越高。By means of establishing a game model between the largest shareholders and other major shareholders,this paper makes a comprehensive study of the relationship with regard to tunneling,collusion and stock ownership check-and-balance among the major shareholders. The basic conclusions are as follows：（ 1） Improving the supervision efficiency of other major shareholders and reducing monitoring costs can help curb tunneling behavior of the largest shareholders;（ 2） Increasing the penalties for the largest shareholders who tunnel company＇s assets can help strengthen stock ownership check-and-balance;（ 3） There is a positive correlation relationship between the legal protection of minority shareholders and tunneling behavior.Therefore,there exists a higher probability that the tunneling behavior of the largest shareholders will to be found.

关 键 词：大股东掏空 合谋 股权制衡 博弈 投资者保护 大股东监督 监督效率 第二类代理问题 股权分置改革 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]