环境不确定性、CEO权力与现金股利分配  

Environmental Uncertainty,CEO Power and Cash Dividend Distribution

作　　者：黄国良[1] 郭道燕[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《商业研究》2015年第8期156-163,共8页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"管理防御;资本结构与公司业绩研究";项目编号:11BGL028;高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目"管理防御与资本结构问题研究";项目编号:2011009511003

摘　　要：目前,现金股利影响因素研究主要依据股利信号理论和股利代理理论,并不能完全解释我国上市公司现金股利分配异象。从管理层权力理论视角,本文以我国2008-2013年1 024家沪深A股上市公司的平衡面板数据为样本,实证分析CEO权力对现金股利分配的影响。结果发现:上市公司CEO权力越大,现金股利分配意愿越弱、现金股利分配水平越低;环境不确定性能够显著调节CEO权力与现金股利分配之间的关系,并加剧上市公司不分配或分配较少现金股利的现象。Present research on cash dividend factors are mainly based on signaling theory and agency theory which can- not fully explain the abnormal phenomenon in cash dividend distribution. Based on managerial power theory, this paper empirically tests the effects of CEO power on cash dividend distribution with the samples of 1024 listed companies＇ bal- anced panel data from 2008 to 2013 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Results show that the greater the CEO power, the weaker the distribution willingness of cash dividend, the lower the distribution level of cash dividend; envi- ronmental uncertainty can significantly regulate the relationship between CEO power and cash dividend distribution, which exacerbates the phenomenon that listed companies don＇t distribute or distribute little cash dividend.

关 键 词：现金股利 CEO权力 环境不确定性 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]