管理层权力、技术创新投入与企业绩效  

Managerial Power, Technological Innovation Input and Firm Performance

作　　者：胡明霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学管理学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《科学学与科学技术管理》2015年第8期140-149,共10页Science of Science and Management of S.& T.

基　　金：重庆市哲学社会科学规划项目(2014PY60);重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ120107);西南政法大学校级科研项目(2012-XZQN28)

摘　　要：以沪深A股市场2009—2012年上市公司为样本,对管理层权力、技术创新投入与企业绩效三者之间的关系进行实证研究,结果表明:(1)结构权力对技术创新投入和企业绩效起负向调节作用,结构权力会增加股东与高管之间的代理成本,不利于企业技术创新投入的有效执行;(2)声誉权力对技术创新投入和企业绩效起正向调节作用,总经理在外兼职会降低股东与高管之间的代理成本,有利于企业技术创新投入的有效执行;(3)专家权力和所有权权力对技术创新投入与企业绩效无调节作用,但与技术创新投入和企业绩效显著正相关,专家权力和所有权权力有利于直接选择创新能力较强和业绩较好的企业投资。This paper studies the relationship between managerial power, technological innovation and firm perfor- mance. We found that： （1） The organizational structure of managerial power was negatively moderated the relation- ship of technological innovation input with firm performance, which indicated that the organizational structure of managerial power would increase the agency costs between shareholders. This is not conducive to the effective im- plementation of technological innovation input. （2） The reputation power played a positive moderating effect on the relationship of technological innovation input and firm performance, which demonstrated the reputation power would decrease the agency costs between shareholders. This is conducive to the effective implementation of techno- logical innovation. （3） Expert and ownership power had no moderating effect. But expert and ownership power had direct effect on firm performance and technological innovation input.

关 键 词：结构权力 专家权力 所有权权力 声誉权力 技术创新投入 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F272.5[经济管理—国民经济]