不对称信息下逆向供应链激励机制研究  

Study on Motivation Mechanism of Reverse Supply Chain under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：肖冲[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《物流技术》2015年第13期221-223,296,共4页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的逆向供应链系统,研究了制造商的激励机制。首先研究对称信息条件下集中及分散模式的供应链,求出制造商和零售商以及供应链整体的收益;其次研究了在信息不对称条件下,零售商成本为私人信息时,制造商激励机制问题,并推导出激励机制的解析表达式。最后通过数值仿真验证模型,结果显示,激励机制设计提高了供应链整体收益。In this paper, in view of the reverse supply chain system composed by one manufacturer and one retailer, we studied the motivation mechanism of the manufacturer. First, we studied the the supply chain with symmetric information respectively under the centralized and distributive organization modes, and obtained the revenue of the manufacturer, the retailer and the supply chain as a whole; next, we studied the motivation mechanism of the manufacturer where the information was asymmetric and the retailer cost was private information and derived the mathematical expression of the motivation mechanism. At the end, through a numerical example, we demonstrated how the motivation mechanism designed could improve the overall revenue Of the supply chain.

关 键 词：不对称信息 逆向供应链 博弈 激励机制 

分 类 号：F252.19[经济管理—国民经济] F274