现金股利、控制权结构与股价崩溃风险  

Cash Dividends,Control Rights Structure and Stock Price Crash Risk

作　　者：顾小龙[1] 李天钰[1] 辛宇[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广东广州510275

出　　处：《金融研究》2015年第7期152-169,共18页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272201和71372151)以及重点项目(71232009)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究了上市公司在具有不同实际控股股东控制权结构下,现金股利与股价崩溃风险的关系。结果表明,过度支付现金股利会显著增加上市公司的股价崩溃风险;实际控制股东控制权与现金流权的分离程度会加剧现金股利与股价崩溃风险之间的正向关系。我们认为这一现象是现金股利中所蕴含的股东治理效应在资本市场上的体现。其现实意义在于,政策监管要着力于治"本",通过提升公司治理水平以使股利分配真正立足于保护全体股东的利益。This paper analyzes the relationship between cash dividends and stock price crash risk in China＇ s listed firms, combining the effects of actual controlling shareholders＇ control rights structure. We find that the over - payment of cash dividends is positively related with stock price crash risk. In addition, the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights aggregates the positive relationship between cash dividends and crash risk. The empirical results reflect the shareholder＇ s governance effects embedded in cash dividend policy. Simply increasing cash dividend distribution ratio might not be an effective method to protect investors. For regula- tors, the real core is to improve corporate governance, so that the dividend policy can truly conform to the interests of all the shareholders, rather than be manipulated by some specific shareholder.

关 键 词：股价崩溃风险 现金股利 现金流权 控制权与现金流权分离程度 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]