论亨普尔对“确证原则”和“证伪原则”的批判  

On Hempe's Critique on the Principle of “Affirmation” and “Falsification” Regarding the Standard of the Sentence's Cognitive Significance

作　　者：徐强[1] 桑田[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430072 [2]电子科技大学中山学院外国语学院,广东中山528402

出　　处：《湖州师范学院学报》2015年第7期30-34,共5页Journal of Huzhou University

基　　金：国家留学基金委的资助

摘　　要：亨普尔基于逻辑公理,指出"确证原则"违反了公理A和两个推论A1和A2。类似地,"证伪原则"也违反了上述公理。亨普尔认为"确证原则"过于狭窄,而"证伪原则"又太过于宽泛。他提出了一种整体的解释理论系统的观点,同时对意义解释系统的特点提出了四点要求。亨普尔的观点为蒯因彻底批判逻辑经验主义提供了重要的理论来源和启示。The present paper mainly explicates Hempe＇s critiques on the principle of ＂affirmation＂ and ＂falsification＂ toward the standard of the cognitive significance of the proposition. Based on the lo- gistic postulates, Hempe pointed out that the ＂affirmation＂ principle violates A theorem and its two in- ferences. A1 and A2. Seemingly, the ＂ falsification＂ principle disobeys the above theorems too. In Hempe＇s view, it is too narrow to the ＂affirmation＂ principle and too wide to the ＂falsification＂ princi- ple. In the end, Hempe made out an opinion of the ＂holistic explanation system＂, and he gave four re- quirements on the system. In conclusion, Hempe＇s idea is a theoretical origin and inspiration to the fol- lowing critiques on the Logical Empiricism, especially Quinces ＂Two Dogmas of the Empiricism＂.

关 键 词：认识意义 确证原则 证伪原则 

分 类 号：B812.2[哲学宗教—逻辑学]