关于企业信用信息共享机制的博弈论研究——以中国人民银行企业信用信息基础数据库为例  

Research on Game Theory regarding Enterprise Credit Information Sharing Mechanism——A Case of the People's Bank of China Enterprise Credit Information Database

作　　者：鞠卫华[1] 王进[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行青岛市中心支行,山东青岛266071 [2]国家开发银行青岛市分行,山东青岛266071

出　　处：《征信》2015年第7期4-8,共5页Credit Reference

摘　　要：中国人民银行企业信用信息基础数据库现已成为金融机构防范信用风险的关键工具。然而目前信息共享限于查询者本身,影响了信息的有效沟通。为此,以中国人民银行企业信用信息基础数据库为例,运用博弈论方法构建理论模型,以此说明公布授信机构名称有利于增强对企业信用情况的准确判断,可对金融系统稳定起到积极的维护作用。The People＇ s Bank of China （ PBOC ） enterprise credit information database has become a key tool for financial institutions to guard against credit risks. However, the information sharing is limited to the querying user itself, which affects the communication of the information. Therefore, taking the PBOC enterprise credit information database for example, the paper establishes a theoretical model by using the game theory, so as to explain that publishing names of the credit - granting institutions is conducive to enhancing the accurate judgment of the enterprise credit conditions, and has positive maintenance role in achieving the stability of financial system.

关 键 词：信用信息 金融稳定 基础数据库 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]