独立董事抑制控股股东“掏空”作用探析——来自董事会投票的证据  

Can Independent Directors Restrain Controlling Shareholders from Tunneling——Evidence from Board Voting

作　　者：张云[1] 

机构地区：[1]内江师范学院经济与管理学院,四川内江641199

出　　处：《内江师范学院学报》2015年第8期33-39,共7页Journal of Neijiang Normal University

摘　　要：本文利用强制披露的独立董事在董事会议案中投票的特殊数据,检验了独立董事制度能否在控股股东"掏空"上市公司上发挥抑制作用.研究认为,由于控股股东"掏空"上市公司增加了独立董事声誉损失,乃至法律风险,独立董事基于维护声誉和规避法律风险考量,一定程度上将对控股股东的"掏空"行为说"不",有效途径之一便是在董事会议案上的发表异议意见,直接向中小投资者传递专家信息,使其关注公司行为、识别控制股东"掏空"行为,从而起到抑制控股股东"掏空"上市公司的动机,维护中小股东利益的作用.The unique data of board voting results on management proposals is used to examine the impacts of independ-ent directors on the tunneling of control shareholders.It is found that due to the loss of the independent directors’reputation incurred from the shareholders’tunneling of a listed company and the worse still legal risks,the independent directors,for the sake of maintaining their reputation and decreasing legal risks,will have to say no to the tunneling acts of the shareholders in some degree.One of effective ways is to voice their dissent to the board proposals,or simply disseminate expert information a-mong the medium and small investors so as to boost their alertness on company acts and discern the shareholders’tunneling acts and thus to restrain their motives of tunneling and thus to protect the small and medium shareholders’interests.

关 键 词：独立董事 董事会投票 抑制掏空 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]