网络支付行业主体反洗钱博弈模型及策略研究  

Research on anti-money laundering game theory model and strategies of network payment industry players

作　　者：詹欣[1,2] 乔晗[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学管理学院,北京100190 [2]中国支付清算协会,北京100033

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2015年第8期1947-1955,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71003057;71373262;71390330;71390331)

摘　　要：本文构建网络支付行业主体反洗钱博弈模型,描述监管机构、金融机构、支付机构、洗钱者等参与主体的效用函数;基于成本收益法和博弈分析,研究影响各类主体效用函数的主要因素及其行为策略;通过系统仿真验证监管机构查处力度和市场主体自查力度的增强能够有效抵御洗钱金额增加导致的国家效用损失,对市场主体处罚力度的加大能够提升国家效用水平;并据此提出防范网络支付行业洗钱风险的相关政策建议.An anti-money laundering game theory model of network payment industry is established to describe the players＇ utility functions, including regulator, financial institutions, the third party payment institutions and money launderers. The cost-benefit method and game analysis are used to research the main influence factors of players＇ utility functions and behavior strategies. Several conclusions are proved by system simulation, which include the enhancement of the power of investigation and self-examination can effectively cover the loss of national utility caused by the increase of the amount of money laundering, and the increase of the power of punishment to players can raise the level of national utility. Several pieces of policy advice are proposed based on the conclusions to prevent the money laundering risk of network payment industry.

关 键 词：反洗钱 网络支付 博弈 仿真 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] F832[理学—数学]