司法过程中的经验推定与认知偏差  

Experience Corollary and Cognitive Bias in Judicial Process

作　　者：陈林林[1] 何雪锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学光华法学院,杭州310008

出　　处：《浙江社会科学》2015年第8期26-32,共7页Zhejiang Social Sciences

基　　金：国家2011计划司法文明协同创新中心研究成果,获教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(编号:NCET-13-0512);国家社科基金项目“疑案裁判中的法律判断模型研究”(编号:10CFX033)资助

摘　　要：法官在运用经验法则认定案件事实时,容易出现认知偏差,对彭宇案判决书的分析证明了这一事实。实验研究进一步证明,经验推定作为一种思维活动,受制于法官作为普通人所存在的两种认知偏差:代表性启发式和后见偏见。改善经验推定,需要在司法制度中引入"普通人"视角,即对法官进行统计学和决策理论训练以抑制代表性启发式的影响,并引进法官之间的个案分工协作制以防范后见偏见。When the judge decides the case facts by the rule of thumb,he always falls prey to cognitive bias,which can be proved by the court verdict of Xu Shoulan vs. Peng Yu. Experimental researches also prove that experience corollary,as a kind of thinking activity,is restricted to two types of cognitive bias,that is representativeness heuristic and hindsight bias,because the judge is a normal people. To improve experience corollary,it is necessary to introduce the perspective of normal people into the judicial system,train the judges with statistics and decision-making theory to avoid the influences of representativeness heuristic,and use the labor division and cooperation system to avoid the influences of hindsight bias.

关 键 词：经验推定 认知偏差 代表性启发式 后见偏见 

分 类 号：D916.2[政治法律—法学] D90-051