供应链相关契约仿真的预付账款融资模型  

A Simulation of the Supply Chain Contract in the Prepayment Financing Mode

作　　者：史慧[1] 杨勇[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]天津职业技术师范大学,天津300222

出　　处：《工业工程》2015年第4期79-84,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal

基　　金：国家科技基础工作专项(2013IM030100)

摘　　要：以博弈论为模型的预付账款融资研究,在时间延迟和动态变化等复杂情况下无法求出解析解,为探究复杂环境下的供应链中的融资参数和决策参数的变化。本文以预付账款融资模式为研究对象,利用系统动力学原理分别构建了该模式下供应链采取批发价格契约和收益共享契约时的动力学模型,通过仿真模拟分析了在采取该两种不同契约下的相关数据。研究发现采取批发价格契约下零售商有更充足的继续采购资金,可以更快地完成资金周转;但是在采取收益共享契约时,在系统周期末供应链总收益更高。In a research on receivables financing with the game theory as the model, in time delay and the dynamic changes of the complex conditions, model cannot be solved analytically, In order to study the fi- nancing of parameters and decision parameters under complex environment in the supply chain, an advance payment financing model is established as the research object, using the system dynamics principle respec- tively to construct the mode of supply chain under the wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract of dynamic model. On the basis of a simulation analysis of the two kinds of related data under different contracts, it is discovered that retailers under the wholesale price contract can achieve a better capital flow with more continue purchase money while under the revenue-sharing contract the gross income of supply chain is relatively larger at the end of the cycle of each node.

关 键 词：供应链管理 预防账款融资 系统动力学 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]