我国独立董事对中小股东权益保护的实证研究  

Empirical Research on Minor Shareholders' Rights and Interests Protection from Independent Directors

作　　者：黄仕英[1] 曹湘平[2] 

机构地区：[1]天职国际会计师事务所,江西南昌330038 [2]湖南工业大学财经学院,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《湖南工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2015年第3期40-46,共7页Journal of Hunan University of Technology(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：通过采集我国深市A股普通机械制造业板块34家上市公司的相关数据,实证分析我国独立董事与中小股东权益的关系。指出提高独立董事的绝对数量和相对数量,能有效的促使独立董事参与公司治理,保护中小股东权益;要提高独立董事参与公司治理的程度,必须进一步规范独立董事的相关规定;独立董事报酬水平与中小股东权益保护之间不存在显著的倒U型关系,其担任独立董事的收入仅仅是其总收入的一小部分,薪酬激励对于行权的影响并不大,他们可能更在乎自己的声誉,建议建立独立董事声誉激励机制。Through the acquisition of 34 listed companies of general machinery manufacturing sector in shenzhen A shares in China,the relationship between the independent director and the rights and interests of minor shareholders is empirically analyzed. It suggested as follows： independent directors can effectively participate in corporate governance and protect the rights and interests of minor shareholders by improving the absolute and relative number of independent directors; we must further standardize the relevant provisions of the independent directors in order to improve the independent directors’ enthusiasm of participating in corporate governance; there is no significant inverted U- shaped relationship between the remuneration level of independent directors and the protection of rights and interests of minor shareholders,the independent directors’ income,which served as the independent directors,is only a small part of the total income,salary incentive does not have a significant impact on exercising,they may care more about their reputation,it is recommended to establish reputation incentive mechanism of independent directors.

关 键 词：独立董事 中小股东 权益保护 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]