多回收商闭环供应链上政府再制造补贴的内生化  

Endogenous Government Subsidies and Optimal Recycling Incentive Contract on Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：张汉江[1] 余华英[1] 李聪颖[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2015年第14期224-230,共7页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71420107027);湖南省社科基金课题(2012YBA070)

摘　　要：政府给予制造商用于废旧电器电子产品回收处理的财政补贴将鼓励制造商的回收再制造活动.将政府也作为一个决策主体,建立了以政府为领导者,制造商和回收商为跟随者的回收再制造过程的主从博弈.其中假定制造商对回收商回收努力采用最优激励契约方式.针对两种不同的产业组织结构建立和求解了这个动态博弈.通过对均衡结果的边际分析讨论了政府决策如何影响制造商和回收商之间的激励契约,以及政府、制造商和回收商的决策在不同产业组织结构的绩效.The government acted as a decision maker to subsidize the manufacturer for recovering and remanufacturing the wasted electrical and electronic goods.We established a Stackelberg game in which the government is the leader while the manufacturer and recyclers are the follower.There was principal-agent relationship between the manufacturer and the recyclers.We researched two industrial organization and analyzed their equilibriums respectively.As a result,we find how the government decision affects the contracts between the manufacturer and the recyclers,and how different industrial organization affects government decision.

关 键 词：物流与供应链管理 动态博弈 内生化补贴 激励机制 产业组织 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F713.2[经济管理—国民经济] F812.45