产能约束对闭环供应链回收渠道选择的影响  

Effect of Capacity Constraint on Choice of Collecting Channels in Closed-loop Supply Chain

作　　者：舒秘[1] 聂佳佳[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆师范大学涉外商贸学院独立学院,重庆401520 [2]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2015年第4期52-57,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重大项目(71090402);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101120;71101055);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630183)

摘　　要：在制造商存在产能约束下,建立了再制造闭环供应链回收渠道决策的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了三种回收渠道下的回收率、零售价以及制造商、零售商和供应链的利润,分析了制造商的生产能力对回收渠道决策的影响。研究表明:存在产能约束时,制造商回收渠道中的回收率总是最高的,这与无产能约束时零售商回收渠道中回收率最高的情况明显不同;同时,若废旧产品回收转移支付价格较低,制造商会选择自己回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商、零售商和供应链利润最高;若回收转移支付价格较高,制造商会选择零售商回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商和供应链利润最高。We develop three Stackelberg models with capacity constraints in order to study decisions of collecting used products in closed-loop supply chain. By comparing the product return rate, retail price, profits of the man- ufacturer and retailer in the different channel models, we find that with capacity constraint, the product return rate is the highest in the manufacturer-collecting model. It is significantly different in the situation without capaci- ty constraint. If the transfer price of returned product is low, the profit of the remanufacturer and retailer, and sup- ply chain will be the highest in the manufacturer-collecting model, and the retail price will be the lowest in this model; if the transfer price of returned product is high, the retail price will be the lowest and remanufacturer＇ s profit the highest in the retailer-collecting model. So the best choice for the manufacturer is retailer-collecting.

关 键 词：供应链 回收渠道 STACKELBERG博弈 产能约束 再制造 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]