动态锦标赛中代理人努力行为与拆台行为的实验研究  

An Experimental Study of the Agents' Productive Efforts and Sabotage Behavior in Dynamic Tournament

作　　者：闫威[1] 周婧[1] 李娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2015年第3期124-136,共13页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年基金资助项目(12CJY021);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(11YJC790225);重庆大学中央高校基本科研业务费科研专项(CDJSK11070;CDJRC11020003)

摘　　要：在动态锦标赛环境下,采用真实努力实验方法,研究阶段性绩效信息公开与否、拆台成本高低、竞赛规则是否公平三个因素对代理人努力行为和拆台行为的影响。利用对100个被试进行的5个真实努力实验,论文得到以下结论:第一,阶段性绩效信息公开可提升代理人的努力水平,并提高最终产出。第二,提高拆台成本,可有效减少代理人的拆台行为。第三,因竞赛规则的歧视性(起点不公平)而处于劣势的代理人,并没有放弃竞赛,而是付出更高的努力水平;起点不同机制下的产出并不低于起点相同机制下的产出。第四,本研究并未发现代理人在第一阶段"保存实力"的棘轮效应,实际上代理人第一阶段的努力水平高于第二阶段,该现象支持了"职业关注"假说。The market, industry, and organizational environments, as well as international competition are complex, dynamic and uncertain with the increasing globalization. Therefore, it＇s necessary to examine the agents＇ behavior pattems and characteristics in a dynamic environment. For example, the promotion of employees often takes several years or even longer. Sports competitions, such as the Dakar Rally, have a number of different stages. Consequently tournament mechanism has been studied extensively, and the dynamic tournament has also aroused the concerns of scholars. Past researches of tournament mechanisms focused on static environment. According to the principal＇s institutional arrangements, agents choose their own effort level before the start of the contest throughout the whole tournaments period, and the level of effort is not changed. However, the reality is not the case. First of all, the tournament in reality is often carried out in a longer period of time and tournament mechanism has the typical characteristics of multi-stage. Secondly, factors, such as information communication, information leaks, malicious inquiry and interim evaluation, will lead to a general understanding of the current state of its competitors. Based on the understanding, the agents adjust their own behaviors in if the long term exchange rate is forecasted by the theory of interest rate parity in the latter phase. Thirdly, to win the contest the agents who have learned their competitors＇ performance information have two options. The first option is to improve their own level of effort, and the second option is to sabotage competitors. Finally, the unfair problem could arise if agents join the tournaments at different starting points. To enrich the current research, we adopt the real effort experiment and focus on the influences of the following factors on agents＇ behavior of effort and sabotage： the existence of interim feedback （yes or no）, the sabotage cost （ high or low）, and the starting points （same or no0.

关 键 词：动态锦标赛 阶段性绩效信息 拆台行为 拆台成本 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] C931.2[经济管理—国民经济]