家族企业特征与投融资政策选择  

Family Firms Characteristics and Policy Choice of Investment and Financing

作　　者：赵宇恒[1] 金世辉[1] 尹雪娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学管理学院,吉林长春130022

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学学报》2015年第5期54-61,159,共8页Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"TMT变更;创业战略选择与企业成长绩效关系:基于创业板上市公司的案例比较研究"(71372077)

摘　　要：本文将家族企业＂控制权特征—管理权特征—决策行为＂纳入统一的研究框架,从投融资政策角度,对经理人的行为选择以及金字塔控制的调节作用进行实证研究。基于2008-2012年中国沪深两市上市家族企业样本研究发现：家族经理人倾向于采用低负债、高长期投资政策;金字塔控制对家族经理人低负债政策具有负向调节作用,对高长期投资政策没有显著影响。以上结果表明：家族经理人具有明显的控制权偏好和风险规避特征;家族经理人与职业经理人在决策行为上存在显著差异,而金字塔控制对其决策行为具有调节作用。Incorporating family firm's'Control Characteristic—Management Feature—Decision-making Behavior'into the unified research framework,this paper makes an empirical study on the manager's behavior choice and the adjustment of pyramid control from the perspective of investment and financing policy in order to open the'black box'of decision-making.Based on the sample of Chinese listed family firms between 2008 and 2012,the study finds that Family managers tend to adopt financial policies such as low leverage and high long-term investment;The pyramid control has a negative impact on low debt policy of family managers,but has no significant influence on the high long-term investment policy.The results show that family managers have obvious control preference and risk aversion;There is a significant difference on the decision-making behavior between family managers and professional managers,and the pyramid control has regulation to the family managers'decision-making behavior;Family managers' low leverage tendency may be the cause and internal mechanism which induces corporate value or performance of family firms.

关 键 词：家族企业 金字塔控制 家族化管理 决策行为 投融资政策 

分 类 号：F242[经济管理—劳动经济]